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THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an overview of the tax 
compliance problem, provide a description of the purpose of the 
research, and to describe the organization of the remainder of the 
dissertation. 
United States Tax Law--An Overview 
The current United States tax structure is directly traceable to 
1913 and passage of the 16th Amendment. This amen&nent made constitu-
tional a tax on incomes--a form of tax in dispute up until that time. 
The 16th Amendment to the u.s. Constitution reads, 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment 
among the several states and without regard to any census or 
enumerations. 
The intent of the amendment was simply to allow the government to 
assess an income tax for revenue raising purposes. However, this 
simple beginning has evolved into a complex maze of rules and proce-
dures whose components include the Internal Revenue Code, Tax 
Regulations, Revenue Rulings, and common law provided by the courts in 
interpreting the tax laws. 
1 
2 
Until 1939, the income tax laws were relatively simple and taxes 
I 
were levied on just 6 percent of the population [Goode, 1964]l Raising 
revenue to operate the government appears to be the primary objective 
of the tax law during this time period. During the time period 1939 to 
1954, the scope of the tax law expanded rapidly. By 1945, 74 percent 
of the population had to pay federal income tax [Goode, 1964]• Many 
changes in the law were an outgrowth of equity considerations because 
! 
the increasing complexity created a need for more rules and clarifica-
tion of said rules [Sommerfeld, Anderson, and Brock, 1982]. Finally, 
in 1954, congress passed the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which was a 
comprehensive revision and reorganization of the 1939 Revenue Code. 
I 
The recodification was an effort to delete obsolete material and make 
the Code more understandable [U.s. Congress, House, H. Rept. 1337]. 
All revenue measures which changed the tax law since 1954 have been 
incorporated into that codification. 
It appears that the Internal Revenue Code revisions made during 
the period between 1954 and 1969 were primarily designed to achieve 
social and economic objectives. Congress utilized the tax law to 
manipulate the private sector by offering incentives to taxpayers to 
engage in activities deen~d good for the public. For example, the 
investment tax credit (ITC) was implemented to encourage private sector 
purchases of Section 38 property (basically tangible personal property 
used in a trade or business or for the production of income). After 
initial introduction in 1962, the ITC provisions were frequently 
modified as Congress continued to m~nipulate investment spending and 
saving activity [Sommerfeld, Anderson, and Brock, 1982]. 
3 
I 
Since 1969, public concern about abusive tax avoidance s~hemes has 
I 
grown [Sommerfeld, Anderson, and Brock, 1982]. Legislative emphasis 
has been directed at tax reform, tax equity, and fiscal responsibility. 
Many tax shelters have been eliininated. The Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) has been granted more extensive power to enforce the law, and 
taxpayer and preparer penalties have been. greatly increased. The 1976 
Tax Reform Act introduced several statutory provisions regulating the 
conduct of tax return preparers. Additional sanctions have been imple-
mented since 1976 [Laufer, 1980]. A shift in emphasis is apparent 
considering the fact that prior to 1976 the Internal Revenue Code pro-
vided few provisions which affected the conduct of tax return preparers. 
Although new tax legislation is often directed by social and ~conomic 
objectives (as evide~ced by the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act which 
was predominantely an economic incentive tax bill), it appears that at 
present there is an overriding concern with assuring compliance with 
the existing tax laws. This is evidenced by the "compliance gap" 
hearing held by the subcommittee on oversight of the Internal Revenue 
Service of the Senate Finance Committee [U.S. Congress, Senate 
Hearings, 1982]. 
Tax Law Compliance 
The Internal revenue laws in the United states impose a tax on the 
income of individuals and various organizations. The taxes are levied 
and collected under what is predominantly viewed as a self-assessment 
system. Additional taxes may not be assessed by the government until 
numerous costly legal procedures have been taken. The economic effi-
ciency of the u.s. taxing system is dependent on a high level of 
4 
I 
voluntary compliance. If voluntary compliance declines, the government 
I 
must increase its audit, assessment, and collection activities to 
prevent a decline in tax revenues. This, in turn, would result in an 
increase in the cost of administering the tax law, which means that the 
share of the tax revenues available for other government functions 
would decline. 
The widespread belief in the country today is that there is a 
~ 
decline in voluntary compliance [U.s. congress, senate Hearings, 1982]. 
Verification of this belief is a diffucult task due, in part, 'to diver-
gence of opinion as to what exactly constitutes noncompliance and how 
it is best measured. If the assumption is made that for each taxpayer 
there exists a "correct" tax liability, then noncompliance would be the 
reporting of a tax liability in some amount other than the correct one. 
The cause of the discrepancy could be due to misstatement or omission 
of items of income or expense or an error in the calculation of the 
liability, given the correct income and expense data. such misstate-
ments could be intentional or unintentional. 
The working definition of noncompliance utilized by the IRS under 
the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) is basically as 
detailed above. That is, noncompliance is the difference between the 
reported and correct tax liability. The objective of the TCMP is to 
provide information on taxpayer compliance characteristics for the 
purposes of optimizing enforcement activity. Based on information 
gathered through the TCMP, an estimate of taxpayer compliance is made. 
This measurement, called the voluntary compliance level (VCL),:provides 
a percentage of the proportion of total tax liability voluntarily 
reported by the taxpayer to total correct tax liability as de1ermined 
by the government, such that: 
where: 
X. X. 
V1. = y1, X 100 = 1 X 100 x. + (Y.-x. > 
1 1 1 1 
Vi = Voluntary compliance level 
xi = Tax liability reported by taxpayer 
Yi = Total correct tax liability 
Note that it is possible for x1 to be greater than Yi. This would 
cause Vi to be greater than 100 percent. The noncompliance in such 
a case would result in an overreporting of tax liability. 
Numerous factors are viewed as contributing to noncompliance, not 
the least of which is tax law complexity: 
The precise reasons for the decline in voluntary compliance 
cannot be easily identified; however, a number of factors may 
contribute to the problem •• For example, the complexity of 
the tax code and frequent changes in its provisions may 
contribute to higher levels of taxpayer misunderstanding than 
existed in earlier times. This higher level of misunderstand-
ing would lead to an increase in inadvertent noncompliance. 
[U.S. Congress, Senate Hearings, 1982, p. 39] 
5 
In an attempt to deal with this "inadvertent" noncompliance, there 
have been numerous calls for simplification. The legislation which 
dealt most directly with this problem was the Tax Reduction and Simpli-
fication Act of 1977 [U.S. Congress, Public Law, 1977]. Committee 
reports to the bill reveal that a primary purpose behind the act was 
simplification of the individual income tax [U.s. Congress, s. Rept. 
66]. To the extent that the number of computations required by an 
individual can be reduced, the tax law will be more simplified [U.S. 
I 
Congress, s. Rept. 66]. Accordingly, in theory, compliance should be 
enhanced through simplification. 
6 
, 
Any change in the tax law which enhances compliance would improve 
the economic efficiency of the tax system by reducing the relative cost 
of tax assessment and would promote equity within the tax system, or at 
least the perception of equity. However, changes in the structure of 
the tax system are costly to both the public and private sector. 
Within the public sector the costs are manifested in the form of 
direct monetary expenses for printing of items such as hearing pro-
ceedings, committee reports, House and senate bills, Public Laws., revi-
sions to the tax code and regulations. There is also a significant 
opportunity cost. Members of the Congress and their staff must spend 
time researching the social and economic ramifications of proposed tax 
law changes. If tax bills become law, then the Treasury Department and 
IRS will incur costs for updating or promulgating new regulations and 
procedures and retraining personnel. There is also the potential for 
an increased case load on the tax courts if the new law is not inter-
preted in the same way by the goverrunent and taxpayer. Accordingly, 
unnecessary changes will interfere with more efficient use of public 
funds. If unnecessary proposals can be avoided, Congress can spend 
more time on other pertinent issues. The IRS can direct more resources 
to enforcement or other activities and, hopefully, additional tax court 
overload can be avoided. 
The cost in the private sector may be even more significant. Tax 
law changes create the need to use resources in the private sector in a 
manner similar to that of the Treasury Department and IRS. Tax practi-
tioners must research the new law, retrain staff, prepare releven~ 
publications, and communicate and review the implications of the change 
with their clients. Litigation with regard to disputes with the IRS 
7 
over the interpretation of a new tax law may divert private sector 
! 
economic resources from more productive use. 
On a broad scale, tax laws appear to have an impact on financial 
decisions and resource allocation. A change in the tax system would 
,, 
create temporary economic disequilibrium and, if ineffective, would 
waste private sector resources. Accordingly, before changes are made 
to simplify the tax law for the purpose of increasing taxpayer compli-
ance, a more rigorous examination of the relationship between complex-
ity and noncompliance should be undertaken. If complexity has a 
significant negative impact on noncornpliance, then policy makers should 
explicitly examine the level of complexity each tax provision creates 
and make adjustments when necessary to simplify the law. If complexity 
is not a significant factor in noncompliance, tax simplification should 
I 
not be attempted or it must be justified on some other grounds. 
i 
Purpose 
Congress, the IRS, and the media all attribute a portion of tax·-
payer noncompliance to the level of complexity in the tax law. The 
purpose of this study was to determine empirically if the level of 
complexity in a self-assessment system has a significant impact on the 
I 
I 
level of compliance within such a system. This study distinguishes 
between two forms of complexity in an effort to provide clear empirical 
evidence as to whether or not a relationship exists between complexity 
and level of noncompliance. A distinction was made between complexity 
i 
in the form of more detailed and numerous computations (computational 
complexity) versus complexity in the ambiguity or subjectivity of rules 
(rule complexity). The study examined the impact on noncompliance of 
both forms of complexity. 
Due to regulations protecting the IRS and the privacy of ~ax­
payers, actual tax records were not available for this study •. There-
fore, the present study was conducted as a laboratory experiment 
utilizing students as surrogates for taxpayers and self-grading of 
examinations as a task surrogate for tax return filing. 
Organization of Remaining Chapters 
Chapter II provides a review of the relevant tax compliance and 
8 
behavioral experimentation literature. Chapter III details the 
methodology employed in the study. Chapter IV offers an analysis of 
the results of the study. Chapter v contains a summary and co~clusions 




In this chapter, the literature pertinent to the present.study is 
reviewed. An overview of the tax literature is presented and 
then the behavioral literature is reviewed. 
Tax Literature 
There has been little published research in the tax compliance 
area. The research which has been published has investigated tax 
evasion from a theoretical and empirical perspective. The theoretical 
studies have utilized rnicroeconomic models for the most part (·for 
example, see [Allingham and sandmo, 1972]; or [Fishburn, 1981]). The 
empirical studies have utilized different methodologies in attempting 
to measure the impact of various factors on the tax evasion decision. 
Friedland, Maital, and Rutenberg [1978] used a simulation approach to 
determine the sensitivity of tax evasion to changes in variables such 
as tax rate, magnitude of fines, audit frequency, and socio-economic 
variables. The experiment provided subjects with a "salary" ~nd 
required that the subjects report the amount of salary earned and the 
corresponding tax liability. The subject's objective was to maximize 
net income (salary minus tax liability). Monetary rewards were 
9 
distributed proportionately based on net income at game's end. There 
were four rounds with ten salary payments per round. The tax !:'ate, 
i 
audit frequency, and penalty level variables were preannounced 1and 
varied over the pay periods. The researchers calculated the frequency 
and magnitude of the difference between reported income and earned 
income. Zero 'order and multiple regression correlation coefficients 
were calculated so to compare the relative impact of the variables. 
Based on the results of the simulation, the rate of tax was found to 
be the most important determinant of the probability of evasion. 
Additionally, large fines were found to be more effective deterrents 
than frequent audits. These conclusions were drawn based on the size 
of the beta coefficient. 
10 
Mork [1975] utilized data obtained from the Norwegian Occupational· 
Life History study in an. effort to assess the impact of level df income 
on tax evasion. The life study questionnaire included a request that 
the respondents state their income. 
I 
Based on the response to the ques-
tionnaire, respondents were divided into income classifications. The 
class intervals were N.Kr. 3000. For the srune respondents income data 
was taken from their tax declarations. The researcher assumed that the 
income stated on the questionnaire by the respondents was their true 
income and that by a comparison of the data inferences could be drawn 
with regard to tax evasion. The average income reported to the tax 
authorities was determined for each income classification and cbmpared 
to the interval midpoint for each class. (The researcher was npt able 
to calculate the average income by classification based on question-
naire response and, therefore, used interval midpoint as a proxy.) The 
income reported as a percent of true or stated income was calculated 
11 
for each class interval. There was a steady decline in the p~rcent of 
income reported to true income as level of income increased. 1
1
The 
author felt the study provided "soft" evidence of the existenJe of tax 
evasion and that tax evasion may increase as income levels increase. 
The study did not provide any statistical analysis beyond the percent 
relationships. The author stated, "interpretation of our empirical 
result is quite complex and should be left to the reader" [Morkf 1975, 
p. 74]. Based on this reader's interpretation, the empirical results 
' appeared inconclusive at best. Deficiencies in the design, data 
collection and assumptions make rigorous statistical analysis of the 
data a fruitless endeavor. For example, accepting a questionnaire 
response to the question of income level as true income and comparing 
this to income as determined within the guidelines of the tax :law 
appears to be an invalid comparison. 
A macro-level empirical study was conducted by Clotfelter [1983]. 
This study involved analysis of the relationship between tax evasion 
and marginal tax rates and utilized aggregate tax data. A model for 
tax evasion was developed based on the difference between reported 
income and the amount of income that the IRS examiners determined to be 
due. The model has the following form: 
where 
x. = y, - v. - u. 
l 1 1 1 
Xi = Individuals' reported income 
Y1 = Individuals' true taxable income 
v1 = Measure of deliberate evasion 
o. = 
]. 
Error term reflecting mistakes in the calculation 
of taxable income 
12 
This equation can be rearranged so that the difference between 
true and reported income is the sum of evasion and error: Y. ~~- X. = v. 
1' 1 1 
The difficulty with this model is that it is impossiblJ to iden~-
' 
tify individual tax evasion. However, if mistakes were random, then 
the Ui's will have an expected mean value of zero, and, it would be 
possible to measure the evasion component within the population. 
Aggregate data reported by the IRS makes it clear that there is a sig-
nificant tendency toward underreporting of taxable income [IRS, 1969]. 
By application of econometric models to aggregate TCMP data, the author 
found that this tendency was sensitive to marginal tax rates. Econo-
metric estimates of the elasticity of underreported income with respect 
to the marginal tax rates were positive and generally significant. The 
author also found that the presence of several different tax forms was 
associated with increased underreporting among non-business returns. 
However, there was no significant effect for business returns. The 
problem with this study is that the variable Vi may be measuring not 
only deliberate evasion but also variances due to the ambiguity or 
subjectivity of tax laws which allow advantageous interpretation of the 
I 
law by the taxpayer. 
The only other aspect of the compliance problem which has been the 
subject of rigorous research is the measurement of unreported income, 
from legal and illegal sources, at the macro-level. studies in this 
area include: Tanzi [1982], Gutman [1977], and IRS [1979]. The proce-
dure utilized in most of these studies has been to estimate the magni-
tude of tax evasion by the currency-based "cash footprint" 1nethod. 
Tanzi utilized an econometric model which explained the ratio of 
currency holdings to money supply as a function of interest rates, 
13 
share of wages and salaries in personal income, per capita income, and 
I 
average tax rates. The ratio was viewed as an indicator of unreported 
transactions. The underlying rationale is that the demand for'money is 
roughly proportional to the flow of total economic activity. By 
statistically controlling the variables and estimating the velocity of 
underground money a regression model was employed to estimate the 
volume of unreported taxable income corresponding to the estimated 
excess currency. A positive correlation between tax rates and currency 
holdings was found which the author interpreted as support for the 
theory that evasion rises with marginal tax rates. 
Gutman [1979] examined the change in the ratio of currency in 
circulation to demand deposits and attributed the increase in the ratio 
over the last 35 years to increased underground activity. Gutman 
reasoned that the incentive to engage in off-the-book work, which 
allows tax evasion, has increased over the past 40 years; and since 
currency is widely used to facilitate this activity, the increase in 
currency ratio must be attributed to increased underground activity. 
For 1976, Gutman's estimate for underground GNP is $176 billion. There 
are some serious flaws with currency-based estimates. The currency 
equations implicitly assume all money demand comes from domestic 
sources, but there is a strong possibility that a large proportion of 
currency in circulation outside the banking system is held by foreign 
investors [Henry, 1983]. Additionally, the use of economic time series 
analysis is statistically flawed by the high degree of correlation 
between variables. There is no strong underlying theory to support the 
relationship between tax rates, noncompliance, and currency demand 
which are. the basis for Tanzi us contentions. Gutman's model, which is 
14 
more simplistic than Tanzi's, does not allow control for vari~les such 
as interest rates, price levels or per capita income. Additi6nally, 
the Gutman model assumes the money velocity of the underground economy 
is equal to that of the legal economy. Evidence exists to the contrary 
[Henry, 1983]. In sununary, accurate measurements of the money supply 
are difficult to obtain and seem to pick up much activity which has 
little to do with noncompliance [Henry, 1983]. 
The IRS has the only truly direct xneasurement technique, the 
previously mentioned TCMP. In a 1979 study the IRS estimated the 
amount of unreported income (from legal and illegal sources) for 1976 
was between $100 and $135 billion. The service does not disclose the 
details of the procedure utilized to arrive at this estimate; conse-
quently, the reasonableness of this estimate is not determinable. 
There are numerous articles, papers, and reports of a heuristic or 
intuitive nature which present an arguxnent for a complexity-compliance 
relationship. The IRS Coxnmissioner, Roscoe Egger, stated that he 
believes that simplifying the tax code would be the most effective way 
to enhance compliance [~all Street Journal, 1984]. In 1985 the 
Congress, in reaction to the complexity problem, is going to further 
study simplification of the tax code and will seriously examine several 
bills which address comprehensive income tax reform. The tax reform 
proposals include the Treasury Department Report [U.s. Treasury, 1984] 
and the Bradley-Gephart Fair Tax Plan [U.s. Congress, s. Rept. 1421]. 
In general, these reform proposats seek to greatly simplify the tax law 
I 
' 
by broadening tax bases, lowering tax rates, and eliminating numerous 
tax preferences. 
15 
Many of the current concepts for reforin are derived from an exten-
sive study of tax reform conducted by the Treasury Department lin 1977 
[U.S. Treasury, 1977]. The private sector has also been activb in 
analyzing the noncompliance issue. It is often an agenda topic at the 
tax conferences of professional organizations, as evidenced by the 1983 
American Bar Association Invitational Conferences on Income Tax Compli-
ance. The lead paper at this conference [Henry, 1983] reviewed the 
various definitions and estimates of noncompliance, pointing out that 
there is no consensus on cause or amount of tax revenues lost due to 
noncompliance. Henry concludes that the real growth in noncompliance is 
uncertain. He recommends nonvoluntary assessment and collection mech-
anisms (i.e., withholding at the source) as well as indirect taxes as 
potential solutions. Additionally, Henry feels continued attempts to 
produce noncompliance estimates and make changes which seem to promote 
increased compliance are desireable. 
From the period 1967 through 1977 there have been only five 
doctoral dissertations which address tax compliance and just two tax 
research endeavors utilizing the laboratory experiment methodology 
[Brighton, Michaelsenf and Willis, 1978]. Only one of these doctoral 
dissertations has relevance to the compliance issue [Marquardt, 1975]. 
In addition, a recent doctoral dissertation endeavored to study 
complexity within an experimental setting [Raabe, 1980]. These two 
works are discussed below. 
Raabe [1980] attempted to deter1nine the feasibility of an ."elec-
tive filing system." Raabe theorized that a degree of complexity could 
be eliminated through an elective filing system which would greatly 
reduce the taxpayers' compliance efforts and costs. Under thi9 system 
16 
the IRS would use "its massive data processing capabilities to boor-
] 
dinate the various information returns that it receives annually. The 
i 
IRS could prepare a tentative computation of each taxpayer's adjusted 
gross income, taxable income, and tax liability. Upon receipt of this 
I 
tentative return, the individual would decide whether to accept its 
determination or to override the proposed return." The study was con-
ducted as a laboratory experiment using both student and nonstudent 
subjects. The subjects were provided .with a set of financial and 
related information for a hypothetical taxpayer and computer-printed 
tentative tax returns fron1 the IRS (hypothetically). The subjects' 
task was to determine if the tentative tax return was complete and 
correct based on their information set and to submit changes if 
necessary. Subjects' responses were stati?tiqally analyzed to deter-
mine if the completeness of the tentative returns affected compliance. 
The results of the experiment indicated that subjects whose tentative 
returns overstated taxable income were more likely to submit revisions 
than those subjects whose tentative returns understated taxable: income. 
It appears that the results do not necessarily indicate that an.elec-
tive system would enhance compliance. 
For the other relevant dissertation, [Marquardt, 1975], the 
researcher interned with the National Office of the IRS which provided 
him with the opportunity to obtain data not typically available to 
i 
other researchers. Eight attributes potentially affecting voluntary 
taxpayer compliance were selected. These attributes were: comi!>lexity, 
tax form difficulty, inadequacy of the instructions, level of judgment 
necessary, effort required to verify information, math computations 
required, underlying records needed, and changes in law. Each I 
17 
attribute was divided into three categories for the purpose of
1 
ordinal 
measurement. The attributes and the categories were both subj~ctively 
determined by the researcher. some attributes were not precis~ly 
defined. Marquardt utilized the Goodman-Kruskal index of order-
association to measure the relationship between compliance and the 
various attributes. The statistical method was applied to the avail-
able data base information. The research findings indicated the exis-
tence of a relationship between five of the attributes and compliance 
for seven classes of tax return preparers. The five attributes were 
ranked as to relative importance; however, no data were provid~d with 
regard to the impact on compliance of varying the requirements or level 
of difficulty within each attribute. 
Behavioral Literature 
There is an extensive body of compliance theory within the 
psychology and social psychology literature. The compliance problem 
has been examined fr~n several perspectives. Studies have explored the 
behavior aspects of task performance. In many situations the task 
I 
performance variable is synonymous with, or at least similar in nature 
to, compliance. The subject's task performance is measured against 
some norm or standard. The independent variable task level represents a 
forrn of complexity but does not capture the essence of the complexity 
variables utilized in the present study. The tasks were typically 
manual in nature and related to job activities. A majority of the 
research falls within the performance analysis paradigm. Within this 
paradigm a widely utilized model for performance analysis is the multi-




Using this basic framework, research efforts have addressed such ques-
tions as the impact of goal setting or other incentive systems on task 
performance with conflicting conclusions regarding the association 
between level of performance and incentives. Within these studies 
goals represented a budgeted level of output. The incentives were 
either a piecemeal rate or bonus system. Findings include: high goals 
contribute to high levels of performance [Locke, 1966], high goals in 
the absence of feedback have little effect on task performance [Locke, 
1968], and goals set too high have negative effect on performance 
[Forward and Zander, 1971]. The intent of the research was tolevaluate 
how best to promote compliance with an assigned or budgeted standard 
(i.e., encourage performance which complys with the norm). The incen-
tive schemes utilized to motivate compliance do not appear to lend 
themselves to application in the taxpaying economy. 
Another fertile ground for compliance research is the effect on 
compliance of task difficulty and task ordering. This appears to be 
directly related to the present study; however, investigation 'of the 
literature revealed an orientation towards specific job applications. 
Within this paradigm, there has been extensive study of the effective-
ness of the two procedures for increasing compliance. These procedures 
are the foot-in-the-door (foot) and the door-in-the-face (face) proce-
dures. In the "foot" technique individuals are asked to first comply 
with simple tasks followed by progressively harder tasks. The "face" 
approach is just the opposite, first seeking compliance with extremely 
hard tasks followed by less difficult tasks, with the latter tasks 
typically being the ones with which actual compliance is desired. 
Empirical evidence supports both techniques as effectively increasing 
19 
compliance [Freedman and Fraser, 1966], [Cialdini and Ascani, 1976]. 
The most effective approach of the two was an initial easy tas:k 




success of either procedure is conditional upon the level of difficulty 
of the tasks [Goldman, Gier, and smith, 1981]. This last findling 
appears to support the generally held intuitive belief that significant 
increases in complexity will result in declining compliance. The 
research does imply that the learning process occurs faster when the 
initial tasks are simple and level of difficulty is progressively 
increased. It is difficult to ascertain whether this phenomenon can be, 
utilized to enhance tax compliance. It does not appear feasible to 
educate taxpayers by beginning with simple tasks and proceeding to add 
complexity step-by-step. 
Another aspect of compliance theory research explores the possible 
effects of negative sanctions (penalties, etc.) on,producing compliance 
with rules or norms. The research within this paradigm has generated 
different, often conflicting, results. Early studies by Ball [1955] 
suggested punishment was of minor importance as a behavioral influence. 
Other research concluded that an increased probability of imprisonment 
is correlated with lower crime rates [Tittle, 1969]. Debate a~d 
research continues with regard to sanctions, although partial reconcil-
iation has been achieved via the wide acceptance of the deterrence 
doctrine [Erickson, Gibbs, and Jensen, 1977]. Simply stated, this 
doctrine provides that the probability of getting caught is the most 
important attribute in deterring noncompliance behavior. With regard 
to the tax economy, this would seem to indicate that the perceived 
I 
probability of being audited and having additi9nal taxes and penalties 
I 
assessed is of greater importance than the penalty structure. 1 Unfor-
tunately, lack of additional resources greatly curtail the abi1lity of 
the IRS to significantly expand audit activity [IRS, 1979]. 
summary 
This chapter presented an overview of prior research in tax com-
pliance. Rigorous empirical investigation of the inadvertent noncom-
pliance issue has been limited. The few tax studies that have. been 
conducted did not conclusively establish the link between complexity 
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and compliance. The behavioral studies sqggest that such a link exists 
in a repetitive learning environment, but it is not clear from. such 
research that such a link exists in non-learning environments such as 
the taxpaying economy. The current study seeks to bridge this gap by 
conducting a laboratory experiment designed to determine whether the 






In this chapter the experimental design and the specific 1structure 
of the experiment are explained. Additionally, the statistical model 
utilized to analyze the data is presented. 
The Experiment 
A laboratory experiment was utilized to allow manipulation of the 
independent variables while facilitating control of the extraneous 
variables. The subjects were 111 college students enrolled in three 
different sections of Principles of Accounting. The experimental task 
was designed to simulate individual taxpayer activities. The subjects 
were provided materials which allowed for self-assessed examination 
grading on each of four different examinations administered during the 
semester. The subjects' task was to determine their examination score 
and communicate the information on the appropriate form to the experi-
menter. The subjects 1 grades in the course were based solely on 
examination scores. 
The hallmark of laboratory experimentation is abstraction, i.e., 
the deliberate manipula~ion of one or more crucial variables, the deli-
berate control of many others and the precise measurement of one or 
more variables of interest [Swieringa and Weick, 1982]. To produce a 
I 
desired phenomena in a laboratory experiment, a variety of procrdures 
which enable the researcher to manipulate, control and measure ~ari­
ables are required. Numerous articles and books have detailed ~he 
factors which can jeopardize validity of an experiment and how the 
problems may be avoided. Campbell and Stanley [1963] discuss eight 
extraneous variables which pose a threat to internal validity if not 
controlled in the experimental design. These effects are: History--
events occurring during the experiment: Maturation--change in subjects 
due simply to passage of time (i.e. , growing tired) ; Testing--effects 
of prior tests on subsequent tests; Instrumentation--potential changes 
in the measuring instrument may produce changes in measurements 
obtained; Selection--bias in selection of respondents; Experimental 
22 
mortality--loss of respondents during experiment; Selection-maturation 
interaction--may be confounded with effect of the experimental vari-
able [Campbell and stanley, 1963, p. 5]. This experiment was patterned 
after the counter-balanced design discussed by Campbell and Stanley 
[1963, pp. 50-52]. The design is discussed more fully in the experi-
mental design section of this chapter. Utilization of this experimen-
tal design was critical in assuring that the internal validity of the 
experiment was sound. 
Unfortunately, external validity (generalizability) cannot be 
achieved with any certainty in a laboratory experiment [Cherulnik, 
1983]. This is because it is not possible to capture every cau~al 
factor in the real-world environment in a laboratory setting 
[Cherulnik, 1983]. For example, in the income tax content it is not 
possible in a laboratory experiment to duplicate the phenomenon of an 
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individual taxpayer incurring daily financial transactions and then 
summarizing the activity, applying the relevant tax law to com~lete and 
file a tax return reporting an actual tax liability. It is also not 
possible to observe the outcome of this process in the taxpaying 
economy. Therefore, with regard to external validity, the attempt 
should be to highlight selected behavioral processes and certain condi-
tions related to these processes [Swieringa and Weick, 1982]. 
Dickhaut, Livingstone, and Watson [1972], in the AAA Committee 
I 
report on Behavioral Accounting Research, established the following 
argument in support of the existence of external validity in a beha-
vioral experiment. 
i) Experimental reality is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for internal validity. 
ii) Internal validity is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for external validity 
Since the factors which can jeopardize internal validity can be con-
trolled in the experimental design, it is on the issue of reality that 
determination of fulfillment of both necessary conditions hinges. 
Experimental reality exists when subjects are "involved" in the exper-
iment [Aronson and Carlsmith, 1968]. It is not the lack of involvement 
per se which threatens experimental realism but rather the lack of a 
particular type of involvement. For example, the use of a mental task 
in the laboratory to simulate a physical task in the real world can 
introduce an unintended high level of subject interest [Birberg, and 
Nath, 1968] • 
Swieringa and Weick [1982] state that experimental realism 
(whether laboratory events are taken seriously) is more important than 
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mundane realism (whether laboratory events are similar to real world 
events) because the focus is more on the effects of stimuli and less on 
' 
the effects on the setting in which the stimuli is typically ~.ncounter-
ed. There appears to be misplaced concern about mundane realism on the 
part of accounting experimenters. swieringa and Weick state that if 
laboratory experiments have experimental realism, there appears to be 
little, if any, need to strive for mundane realism. If the exPerimen-
tal situation is meaningful to the subjects, then the impact on and the 
credibility for the subjects should be such that a behavior similar to 
that found in the real-world setting is evoked and the experimental 
procedures should capture the variable of interest. Mundane realism 
may make it more difficult to learn from the experiment [Swieringa and 
Weick, 1982, p. 34]. An experimental setting within a context. which 
seeks to maintain mundane realism seeks to recreate a real-world situa-
tion within an experiment.al framework. However, the subjects typically 
have little incentive to react and respond to the stimuli as they would 
in the actual situation. Additionally, since the subjects may face the 
situation in their daily activities, they may override the experimental 
manipulation by utilizing skills and routines they already possess. 
This problem is evident within the behavioral research in audit deci-
sion making [Joyce and Libby, 1982]. Wit.hin this paradigm it is not 
' 
unusual to create a fact pack, with regard to a particular audit deci-
sion, which replicates the facts as they might be found in an actual 
audit setting. The subjects, who often are practitioners, in respond-
ing to the question of how they would handle the particular situation 
probably will not have an incentive to be certain the answer is in fact 
in agreement with what would actually occur. The possibility exists 
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that an incentive may be present to respond differently than they would 
in the actual situation. Also, the subjects' backgrounds in the area 
may cause them to utilize their preexisting knowledge in lieu of 
specific experimental information. 
There were three separate surrogate utilizations in the present 
study: 
1) Determination and reporting of examination score as task 
surrogate for determination and reporting of tax liability, 
2) Students as subject surrogate for taxpayers, and 
3) Classroom setting as surrogate for the "real world~. 
Utilization of generic tasks in behavioral studies can enhance 
experimental realism [Aronson and Carlsmith, 1968]. The surrogate task 
utilized in the present study is generic in nature, (i.e., subjects 
were asked to grade and report their own examinations rather than com-
pute and repOrt their own taxable income). An attempt was made to 
achieve a high level of experimental realism without building mundane 
realism into the experiments. The surrogate task utilized was designed 
to achieve a high level of correlation between the subjects' task 
involvement in the laboratory setting and the real world phenomenon. 
The effort to accomplish this is evidenced by the similar nature of the 
task and the instruments employed to complete the task. To grade the 
exams the subjects were required to read and interpret instructions., 
perform mathematical computations, and report results on the appro-
priate forms. This procedure is very similar to that facing taxpayers 
in the tax economy. 
There has been extensive research to investigate the implications 
of utilization of students as subject surrogates. such research has 
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been conducted within the accounting discipline, as well as in other 
social science areas (see, for example, Abdel-Khalik [1974] and Ashton 
and Kramer [1980] or for research outside the accounting discipline see 
Zelditch and Evans [1962]). There is no consensus about the impact of 
using student surrogates in an experiment; however, explicit considera-
tion of the impact of using students must be made on each exper~mental 
factor. The design of the present experiment matched the students' 
incentives with those of taxpayers, i.e., both have something of value 
at risk. Since both have something at risk, the probability of similar 
involvement by students in determining their examination score with 
that of taxpayers in determining their tax liability is increased. 
It is doubtful that a laboratory or classroom can simulate real-
world conditions·. However, Zelditch [1969] argues that the experirnen-
ter only need create those aspects relevant to some theory. There is 
no need to attempt to create a completely "real" instance in the labor-
atory. To the extent that subjects are functioning in an environment 
which necessitates self-imposed compliance with instructions and rules 
that involve varying levels of complexity, it would seem the relevant 
aspects of the taxpaying economy have been replicated. 
The notion that degree of complexity has an impact upon level of 
compliance appears to be accepted within the Congress and Treasury 
Department as if it were a positive model. A result of this has been a 
call for simplification of the individual income tax. The IRS bas 
defined noncompliance to be any variation between true tax liability 
and reported tax liability. The Service views the degree of complexity 
I 
to be a function of the number of computations made by the taxpayer and 
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I 
the intricacy of the tax forms which the taxpayer must utilize [U.S. 
Congress, Simplification, 1977]. 
In analyzing the impact of complexity on compliance, it appears 
there has been a failure to separate rule complexity from computational 
complexity despite the fact that they represent two different phenom-
ena. The present study was designed to measure the impact on compli-
ance of both forms of complexity. To evaluate the effects of rule 
complexity on compliance the rules utilized in grading exams were mani-
pulated. Some subjects received very precise instructions about how to 
determine points earned on a problem, whereas others received more 
general guidelines which required subjective interpretation. To cap-
ture the effects of computational complexity on compliance, some sub-
jects were required to perform only a few, straightforward computations 
and to record their exam score on a simple form, while others were 
faced with more difficult and numerous calculations which were to be 
reported on a more intricate set of forms. The following three null 
hypotheses were tested: 
H0 : As complexity increases compliance will not be 
1 diminished. 
H0 : As computational complexity increases compliance 
2 will not be diminished. 
H0 : As rule complexity increases (becomes more sub]ec-
3 tive) compliance will not be diminished. 
A fourth research hypothesis was tested to determine which form of 
complexity was of greater consequence in the study: 
H0 : Compliance level for cornputational complexity treat-
4 ments is equal to compliance level for rule complex-
ity treatments. 
28 
In devising tax policy and procedures to address the noncoinpliance 
problem, it may be important to distinguish between the kind of complex-
ity to be eliminated. Potentially, the costs of making a change could 
outweigh any benefits gained. 
Theoretically, inadvertent noncompliance due to cornplexit~ should 
be a zero sum game. The direction of errors should be randorlly distri-
buteo with a mean value of zero. That is, if the errors are truly 
inadvertent and random, the number of and amount of errors in the tax-
I 
payer's favor should be equal to those favoring the government~ Other 
factors, most significantly the overt underreporting of tax liability 
for self-enrichrr~nt, obviously affects compliance. Any measurement 
of the impact of complexity on compliance is greatly impeded by the 
confounding effect of the other factors, such as cheating. The design 
of the present study provided an opportunity to observe compliance 
behavior directly with factors other than complexity held constant 
across the sample groups. 
To the extent that effects other than complexity are eliminated 
and errors are strictly inadvertent, the above hypotheses would not be 
rejected because the mean value across the different levels of complex-
ity would all approximate zero. However, the distribution of the 
errors should be increased as the level of complexity increases. 
Accordingly, ·the present study tested the following additional null 
hypotheses: 
H • As degree of complexity increases variability 
0 1A. of differences will not change. 
H0 : As computational complexity increases variability 
2A of differences will not change. 
H0 : As rule complexity increases variability of 
3A differences will not change. 
H . 0 • 
4A 
Variability of differences due to computational 
complexity is equal to variability of differences 
due to rule complexity. 
I 
Administration of the Experiment 
Four examinations were administered to each subject during one 
semester. Each examination was representive of activity for one tax 
year. Examinations were collected upon completion in the normal 
manner. At the class meeting following the examination each student 
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received his/her examination, a set of grading instructions, and forms 
on which to report their examination score. {Appendix A provides an 
overview of the experimental procedures. Appendixes B, c, and D offer 
examples of the instruments). Grading instructions and forms were de-
signed to capture differing levels of complexity. More precisely, sub-
jects received one of four different grading packets: Simple/Objective, 
Simple/Subjective, Complex/Objective, or Complex/Subjective. Figure 1 
presents a graphic illustration of the treatment matrix. 
COMPUTATIONS 
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1!1 igure 1. Treatment Matrix 
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I 
Simple represents computational simplicity, minimal calculati0ns, and 
basic reporting form [see Appendix c, p. 67]. complex refers' to compu-
tational complexity; that is, required calculations were more detailed 
and numerous and forms were more intricate than in the simple setting 
[see Appendix c, pp. 68-70]. The grading instructions represent rule 
complexity. Objective instructions were very exact in providing infor-
mation on how to determine points earned for each exam question; while 
subjective instructions were more general, less specific, and to that 
extent, more ambiguous or complicated. Appendix B includes exrunples of 
objective and subjective treatments. The students were required to 
report (file) their examination score within a set period of time on 
the forms provided. students turned in only the forms; they kept their 
examinations. 
Students were assessed a penalty for late filing of reported exam-
ination scores. Additional enforcement procedures were utilized and 
applied uniformly across the sample. The procedures involved audit 
verification of examination scores and penalties for noncompliance. 
Audit implementation and selection techniques were designed to repli-
cate many of the facets of the IRS process. The examinations were 
stratified into groups by score and then selected for audit ra;ndomly. 
The subjects received letters advising them that they had been select-
ed for audit [see Appendix D, p. 75]. A few of the audits required 
review of the entire examination. The results of these audits were 
used to determine areas of emphasis in future audits. This approach 
appears to replicate the IRS TCMP process. For the remaining audits, 
only selected sections of the examinations were reviewed. This is 
similar to the situation faced by xnost taxpayers selected for audit 
investigation. The penalty structure was provided to the students in 




For purposes of compliance measurement, copies of all examinations 
were made. Every examination was graded by the instructor to determine 
the correct score which was compared to the reported score. This phase 
of the experiment was not disclosed to the subjects until the experi-
ment was completed. Additionally, a select sample of examination pages 
was copied for utilization in the audit verification phase of the 
experiment. 
Subjects' Reward Structure 
Laboratory experiments are often criticized for failure to provide 
incentives that adequately motivate subjects. In the present study an 
attempt was made to overcome this perceived deficiency through the 
reward and penalty structure utilized. All subjects were enrolled stu-
dents in principles of accounting. In order to receive credit for the 
course, the students had to earn a passing grade. The students' grades 
in the course were based exclusively on performance on five examina-
tions. Four of the examinations were self-graded. The students were 
required to report an examination score to get any ~redit at all for 
the examination. They faced the possibility of audit and, if they 
reported an incorrect score, loss of examination points. This reward 
and penalty structure in essence captures the attributes of the self-




A questionnaire was utilized to determine the perceived salience 
of various experimental factors to the subjects. Each subject coin-
pleted the questionnaire after the experiment was completed and before 
the aspects of the experimental procedures were explained. The ques-
tionnaire consisted of sixteen structured (closed) questions with 
Likert attitude scale responses. The subjects also had the opportunity 
to offer general comments. The responses were anonymous. For analysis 
the scale was quantified as follows: definitely yes, 5; yes, 4; not 
applicable, 3; no, 2; definitely no, 1. The questionnaire and the mean 
response and standard deviation for each item are detailed in Appendix 
E (pp. 77-79). 
Experimental Design 
The experimental effect of interest was the impact of the experi-
mental treatment (complexity) on compliance. However, other possible 
experimental effects could occur due to group assemblage and the 
sequencing of treatments. These could pose a threat to internal valid-
ity of the experiment. To avoid these problems, the students were 
assigneq randomly to one of four groups and all students were subjected 
to all treatments. This design is referred to as a counterbalanced or 
rotating design [Underwood, 1949]. Within this framework, a Latin-
square design was utilized. Figure 2 illustrates the design graphi-
cally. 
where: 
Exam 1 Exam 2 Exam 3 Exam 4 
Group A x1o x20 x3o 
Group B x2o x40 x1o 
Group c x3o x1o x40 
Group D x4o x30 x20 
x1 = Simple Computations, Objective Instructions 
X2 = Simple Computations, Subjective Instructions 
x3 = Complex Computations, Objective Instructions 
x4 = Complex Computations, Subjective Instructions 
0 = Measurement of Noncompliance (Reported Score -
Actual Score) 






Utilization of this design made each classification orthogonal, thereby 
permitting between group comparisons while avoiding correlations and 
interactions arising from sequencing, maturation and practice effects. 
This made it possible to statistically analyze the main effect. using 
F-tests from the ANOVA procedure. 
The ANOVA 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a statistical procedure which 
is utilized in the analysis of experimental data. ANOVA provides a 
method for dividing the variation observed in experimental data into 
different parts. Using ANOVA it is possible to assess the relative 
magnitude of variation resulting from different sources and compare 
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the variation with expectations under the null hypothesis [Ferguson, 
1976]. 
Distributional Assumptions 
There are three distributional assumptions made when utilizing 
F-tests within an ANOVA framework to test hypotheses about means. One 
assumption is normality of the dependent variabledistdbution. Unless 
there is reason to suspect a fairly extreme departure from normality, 
it is probable that the conclusion drawn from the data using an F-test 
will not be seriously affected [Ferguson, 1976]. Although the effect 
of departure from normality is to make the results appear more signifi-
cant, it is reasonable to accept this assumption without specific test-
ing if the F-tests do not indicate significant differences in treatment 
means. 
A second assumption is independence of observations. This 
assumption i.s more difficult to evaluate. However, in general, non-
independence of observations increases the probability that treatment 
effects will be indicated for non-efficacious treatments. For an in-
depth discussion of analysis of the normality and dependence assump-
tions see Glass, Peckham, and Sanders [1972]. 
The final assumption is homogeneity of variances; that is, vari-
ances in the population from which the samples are drawn are assumed to 
( . . 2 2 . 2 be equal 1. e., cr-1 = <12 = • • • = u-n ) • There is a good deal of evi-
dence that the ANOVA is virtually unaffected by violations of this 
assumption if the samples are the same size, which they were in the 
present study (Box, 1954]. However, in the present study the equi.-
variance hygothesis is of interest in its own right. Accordingly, in 
addition to testing the hypothesis concerning treatment effects' the 
Levene test was utilized to test for homogeneity of variance. 
The Levene Test 
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The Levene's test procedure involved performing an analysis of 
variance on the absolute deviations of differences from the treatment 
group means. The mean for each of the treatment groups is first calcu-
lated, then the difference between reported and actual exam score is 
subtracted from the calculated mean for each observation within the 
treatment group. The absolute values of these deviation differences 
was the data for computation of an ANOVA. This permitted the use of 
F-tests of the hypothesis that the mean absolute deviation from the 
mean is constant across treatments (i.e., the second set of hypotheses 
presented above). ANOVA procedures allow the treatment means to be 
analyzed for significant differences. The Levene test provides a 
method to test for significant differences in variability present for 
each treatment. Studies of the Levene test indicate that it is 
relatively insensitive to nonnormality of underlying distributions and 
at least as powerful as Bartlett's test [Dayton, 1970]. 
summary 
This chapter presented the design and procedures utilized in con-
ducting the experiment. The statistical models utilized were also 
discussed. In conducting laboratory experiments external validity 
cannot be achieved with any certainty. Apparently, however, th~ pre-
sence of experimental realism does enhance the external validity of the 
experiment. In the present study the generic task utilized allows a 
high degree of experimental realism to be achieved. The probability 
of subject involvement similar to that of taxpayers determining their 
tax liability enhances the generic task experimental design. 
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For the purpose of determining the impact of complexity on compli-
ance, the counterbalanced Latin-square design was utilized. This 
design should enhance the experiment's internal validity and allow 
statistical analysis of the effect of the complexity treatment on com-
pliance using F-test and ANOVA procedures. The Levene test procedure 
was also utilized to permit comparison of treatment group variances. 
In the absence of overt noncompliance, analysis of variability present 
in each treatment provides a method to compare the impact of differing 
levels of complexity on compliance. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the results of the laboratory experiment are 
presented. The results of the experiment are analyzed ana discussed. 
An interpretation of the results is provided. 
Results of Analysis of Data from Experiment 
The objective of the study was to determine if complexity plays a 
significant role in compliance with rules. Towards this end, an experi-
ment was designed which allowed for manipulation of independent vari-
ables so that the experimental effect of the treatments could be 
measured. The dependent variable in the model was the difference 
between reported exam scores ana actual exam scores (reported score -
actual score= difference). The counterbalance research design for the 
model contained three independent variables: occasions (examinations), 
groups, and treatments (complexity level). The main effect independent 
variable of concern was the treatments. The four treatments are: 
simple computational and objective complexity; complex computational 
and objective rule complexity; simple computational ana subjective rule 
complexity; and complex computational ana subjective rule complexity. 
The results of the ANOVA for the Latin-square arrangement are presented 
in Table I. 
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'TABLE I 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE STATISTICS--
FULL MODEL 
---------------------------------------------------------
source Degrees Observed 
of of F Significance 
variation Freedom Ratio Level 
Complexity 3 , 434 .35 0.7928 
Computation 
Complexity 1 , 440 0.74 0.3905 
Rule 
Complexity 1 1 440 0.16 0.6901 
Interaction 1 , 434 0.13 0.7151 
Groups 3 1 434 1.83 0.1389 
Examinations 3 , 434 2.18 0.0880 
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This arrangement keeps the examination and group main effects from 
contaminating the main effect of the complexity treatments. Based on 
data collected and procedures utilized, the null hypothesis of no 
treatment effect cannot be rejected because the F ratio of .35 has an 
observed significance level of .7928 with 3 and 434 degrees of freedom. 
The lack of significant differences between the complexity treatments 
indicates that the level of compliance was not affected by complexity. 
The presence of a strong compliance incentive may be a cause of this 
' 
lack of treatment effect. The penalty and audit structure which was 
applied uniformly across all sample cells was intended to simulate many 
of the features of the penalty and audit procedures provided for in the 
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have been more influential and restrictive than that of the tax law 
and, therefore, compliance was enhanced. Several factors support this 
possibility. Responses to the post-experimental questionnaire indicate 
that 92% of the subjects expected to be audited at least once. Eighty-
seven percent of the subjects stated that the possibility of audit and 
penalties increased their effort to comply. Additionally, 78% of the 
subjects felt that had the instructor graded the examinations, no dif-
ference in score would have occurred. Based on these responses, it 
appears that the students, on the average, expected to be audited. 
This, coupled with the penalty structure, suggests that the enforcement 
structure substantially eliminated overt noncompliance. It is possible 
that inherent differences between the three class sections could dilute 
the treatment effect. The mean differences between actual and reported 
score for the three sections were 0.206, -0.041 and -0.147. These 
differences are less than the treatment mean differences (see Table II, 
pg. 41), which were not significant. Accordingly, it does not appear 
that class sections had an impact on the treatment effect. 
The group classification was fully controlled by assigning each 
person to a group independently and at random. , Accordingly, this 
source of main effect and interaction was removed. The inability to 
reject a null of no effect due to groups at a 10% alpha level is pre-
dictable assuming that overt noncompliance was discouraged by the 
perceived level of audit and that inadvertent noncompliance is a zero-
sum game. 
It would not have been unusual for occasions (examinations) to 
produce an effect due to repeated testing, maturation, practice and 
cumulative carry-over. Therefore, it is not abnormal that this 
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variable, with an observed significance level of .088 was more signifi-
cant than the treatment (complexity) and group variables. 
The results of ANOVA designed to test the two forms of complexity 
are also presented in Table I. The purpose was to compare the impact 
of the two types of complexity on compliance. The treatment matrix, 
Chapter III, Figure 1, details the configuration of these complexity 
components. The null hypothesis of no treatment effect for computa-
tional complexity cannot be rejected because an observed significance 
level for differences is .3905 for an F ratio of .74 with land 434 
degrees of freedom. Similarly, the null hypothesis of no treatment 
effect for rule complexity cannot be rejected because the observed 
significance level for the difference is .6901 for an F ratio of .16 
with 1 and 434 degrees of freedom. The computational complexity, rule 
complexity interaction also is not significant; the observed signifi-
cance level is .7151 for an F ratio of .13 with 1 and 434 degrees of 
freedom. 
These results provide weak support for the hypothesis that compu-
tational complexity is a greater cause of noncompliance than rule 
complexity. However, there does not appear to be sufficient support 
for the contention that either form of complexity has any significant 
effect on the overall level of compliance. 
The analysis of variance presented above addresses the question of 
variation between treatment means. The means and standard deviations 
for the difference between reported and actual scores are reported in 
Table II. 
TABLE II 





Treatment Observation Difference Deviation 
Simple, Subjective 111 0.6667 7.1723 
Simple, Objective 111 0.5405 6.5001 
Complex, Objective 111 -0.3153 8.1664 
Complex, Subjective 111. -0.3423 11.1799 
Total 444 0.0158 8.4277 
The ANOVA does not capture the differences in the degree of vari-
ability within treatments. Inspection of the standard deviations 
listed in Table II above suggests that the variances may not be homo-
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geneous. This observed effect is not measured with the ANOVAs perform-
ed and presented in Table I. To remedy this problem, the Levene test~ 
a procedure which allows examination of the equi-variance hypothesis, 
was used to analyze the data. The results are presented in Table IV. 
The source of variation due to complexity is comparing the differences 
in variability between each of the four treatments: simple, subjec-
tive; simple, objective; complex, objective; complex, subjective. The 
source of variation due to computational complexity has two treatment 
levels. The simple, subjective and simple, objective are combined and 
the variability compared to that of the combined complex, objective and 
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complex, subjective. Similarly, rule complexity also has two treat-
ments which are compared for differences in variability. For rule 
complexity the simple, subjective and complex, subjective treatments 
are combined and compared to that of the simple, objective and complex, 
objective treatments. 
TABLE III 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE STATISTICS--
LEVENE'S TEST 
------~-------------------------------------------
Source Degrees Observed 
of of F Significance 
Variation Freedom Ratio Level 
Complexity 3 , 440 3.46 0.0164 
Computational 
Complexity 1 , 440 5.57 0.0187 
Rule 
Complexity 1 , 440 2.06 0.1519 
The test of the null hypothesis that no difference in variability due 
to complexity treatment effect exists, provided an F ratio of 3.46 with 
3 and 440 degrees of freedom. This test statistic corresponds with an 
Observed Significance Level of 0.0164. 
Splitting the complexity treatment into its two components pro-
vides two additional null hypotheses to test: (1) there is no 
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difference in variability due to computational complexity; and (2) 
there is no difference in variability due to rule complexity. The test 
of the former hypothesis resulted in an F ratio of 5.57 with 1 and 442 
degrees of freedom, and a corresponding observed significance level of 
0.0187. The latter hypothesis had an observed significance level of 
0.1519 based on an F ratio of 2.06 with 1 and 442 degrees of freedom. 
The statistics in Table III indicate that variability in compliance 
behavior is sensitive to the degree of computational complexity 
present. Rule complexity does not appear to be as significant. The 
null hypothesis, i.e.v there is no difference in variability due to 
ruJ:e complexity, cannot be rejected at alpha levels up to 0.15. These 
results would indicate that as the level of computational complexity 
increases there will be a corresponding decrease in compliance due to 
an increase in the frequency and degree of errors. With regard to rule 
complexity it is possible that the objective and subjective treatments 
used in this experiment were not sufficiently different to cause a 
significant difference in compliance. 
surrnnary 
Based on analyses o£ the results it appears that differing levels 
of computational complexity will effect the degree of varability 
present in compliance. However 1 the results of the experiment are not 
able to support the contention that rule complexity has a similar 
effect on compliance. Neither form of complexity appeared to have any 
significant effect on the overall level of compliance in the study. 
The different levels of rule complexity (objective and subjective) may 
not have differed significantly because the two treatments may not have 
been sufficiently different. The presence of strong complianc~ incen-
' I 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of 
the research, provide conclusions drawn from the study, discuss the 
limitations of the study and to offer recommendations for future 
research. 
Overview 
The purpose of this research was to determine if complexity has a 
significant impact on the compliance with a self-assess~ng and report-
ing system. Two forms of complexity were examined: computational 
complexity and rule complexity. This relationship is of interest 
because the perceived increase in taxpayer noncompliance is, in part, 
attributed to tax law complexity. Legal and practical constraints do 
not allow a direct study of the compliance, complexity relationship 
that exists in the actual economy. Therefore, this research project 
made use of a generic task laboratory experiment methodology. 
The experiment was structured so that undergraduate students were 
surrogates for taxpayers. The students graded their own examinations. 
Towards this end, the students were provided with instructions and 
forms (rules) to utilize in determining and reporting their examination 
score. This represented the task surrogate for determining and 
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reporting of tax liability. The instructions and forms were construct 
ed to capture two levels of computational complexity (simple and 
complex) and two levels of rule complexity (objective and subjective). 
The examination scores reported by the student-subjects were utilized 
in determining their course grade. The experimenter also determined an 
exam score for each student (i.e., the correct score) which was com-
pared to the reported score. Students were not specifically aware of 
this fact. The differences between the reported scores and correct 
scores were statistically analyzed. Additionaly, a post experiment 
questionnaire completed by the subjects was analyzed to ascertain the 
perceived salience of various experimental factors by students. 
Conclusions 
The statistical analysis generated two conclusions which merit 
further discussion and interpretation. These are: 
(1) overall level of noncompliance is not significantly affected 
by complexity. 
(2) Variability in con~liance among individuals is affected by 
computational complexity. 
Within the tax structure there is a tendency to under report tax 
liability [IRS, 1969]. The lack of that tendency in the results of the 
present study has policy implications from two standpoints. First, if 
noncompliance is defined as the difference between reported and actual 
tax liability in the aggregate, then based on the results of this study 
complexity does not appear to be a significant attribute in affecting 
compliance because the overall level of noncompliance was constant 
across treatments. Second, the lack of noncompliance in the aggregate 
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provides some insight as to attributes which may have significant 
influence on the level of compliance. The sum of reported exam scores 
for the 444 observations exceed the sum of actual exam scores by seven 
points, or an average difference of 0.015 points per exam. This fact 
indicates a much greater effort to comply, with rules, by the subjects 
than may be present within the self-assessing income tax system of the 
United States. The presence of a strong compliance incentive may be a 
cause of the lack of a treatment effect. The attributes which created 
this strong incentive warrant further investigation because they may 
have the potential to significantly affect the level of compliance. In 
the present study the enforcement structure may have been largely 
responsible for' the high degree of compliance. 
Based on the analysis of the results, there appears to be'a signi-
ficant relationship between the degree of computational complexity and 
the variability between reported and actual scores. That is, the fre-
quency and degree of errors increase as complexity increases. This 
finding has intuitive appeal. As a task becomes more .difficult, one 
would.expect more errors. However, the overall level of compliance is 
not affected, as discussed in the previous chapter. This would indi-
cate that a change in tax law which decreased the level of complexity 
would cause a corresponding decrease in errors (variability) but not 
significantly affect the overall level of compliance. Accordingly, if 
the goal of the policy makers is to reduce the occurences of inadver-
tent noncompliance, then reduction in the complexity level is warrant-
ed. However, the type of noncompliance which appears to concern the 
Treasury and the IRS is "negative" noncompliance (i.e., underpayment of 
true tax liability) [IRS, 1983]. Results of this experiment appear to 
indicate that this form of noncompliance is not of an inadvertjnt 
nature. Therefore, it appears that reduction of the complexit¥ level 
will not significantly alter overall negative noncompliance. 
It may still be desirable to seek simplification of tax law for 
reasons other than affecting the overall level of compliance. It is 
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possible that simplification could increase the equity of the tax law, 
or at least the perception of equity. Also, decreased complexity might 
reduce compliance cost and result in a more efficient use of resources 
in the private sector. The findings of this research tend to indicate 
that the heuristic argument supporting a strong relationship between 
complexity and the overall level of tax compliance is erroneous. 
Accordingly, if the government wishes to enhance the overall level of 
tax compliance, Congress should consider alternatives other than tax 
simplification. 
Limitations 
Behavioral experimental studies raise questions with regard to 
internal and external validity by their very nature. The methodology 
and design of the present study were such that the internal validity 
should be insured. The key to the existence of external validity is 
experimental realism. All factors indicated that the subjects were 
sufficiently involved in the task to insure such realism. The explicit 
reward/penalty structure greatly enhanced the realism. The incentive 
(student's grades) was significant. However, the ability to generalize 
the results is limited because the presence of no variation between 
reported and correct scores in the aggregate may have been due to a 
high level of motivation towards compliance--a level which may not be 
representative of the typical taxpayer. There are several possible 
explanations for this phenomenon. 
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One possible explanation is the existence of a corresponding con-
dition. Compliance with rules is increased when there is rule maker-
individual interaction. One empirical study found that there was a 
difference in compliance when correspondent versus non-correspondent 
conditions exist [Thibaut, Freidlan and Walker, 1974]. In this study a 
correspondent condition also existed since the experimenter was also the 
classroom teacher. The condition was constant across the sample. 
Another. possible source of the strong effort to comply may have 
been the deterrents to noncompliance. The subjects may have viewed the 
magnitude and probability of loss (ranging from loss of points on exrou-
inations to an F in the course) in a different perspective than a 
taxpayer's view of noncompliance sanctions. The apparent lack of 
significant differences in the variability of the rule complexity 
treatments may be inherent in the treatment design utilized in the 
experiment. It is possible that the objective and subjective treat-
ments used in this experiment were not sufficiently different to cause 
a significant difference in compliance. 
Future Research 
The government has expressed concern about inadvertent noncompli-
ance. However, the greater concern is actually with negative noncom-
pliance (actual tax liability greater than reported liability) [IRS, 
1983]. Based on the results of the this study, it appears that com-
plexity is not a significant cause of negative noncompliance. Addi-
tionally, it appears that the audit and penalty structure within the 
50 
experiment had significant impact on the students' attempts t~ comply 
with the rules provided. This observation is supported by the post-
experiment questionnaire and also by informal student feedback. It 
follows that penalty and audit structure may constitute a significant 
compliance attribute and a more effective tool in curbing and control-
ling the apparent rise in noncompliance than tax simplification. 
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The following appendixes provide examples of the various . 
instruments utilized in conducting the experiment. The intent is to 
provide sufficient information here so that the experiment can be 
replicated. Accordingly, a discussion of the content of the appendixes 
is provided below. 
Appendix A includes a flow chart of the experiment procedures and 
an Examination Format Summary. The flow chart provides an overview of 
the sequence of events during the experimental process. The examina-
tion format was consistent for all four examinations. The 160 total 
examination points were utilized in an effort to avoid anchoring on the 
traditional grading scale that many student-subjects associate with a 
100-point examination. Additionally, grading curve information was not 
provided to the subjects until examination scores had been reported. 
Appendix B contains samples of exffinination questions and corres-
ponding answers and instructions. Examples are presented for fill-in-
the-blank problaoo, journal entry problans, and accounting number 
problems. These three types of questions were designed to facilitate 
application of the rule complexity treatments. This was achieved by 
providing either subjective or objective inforn1ation in the answer 
sheet and grading instructions. The examination qUestions were varied 
between the two treatments to negate student collusion which would have 
contaminated the results. Note that the last sentence of grading 
instructions informs the subject which form or schedule to report their 
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score on. These instructions facilitate the application of the 
computational complexity treatment. 
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Appendix c provides copies of the reporting forms utilized for the 
experiment. Form One S was used for simple computations. Form One and 
related schedules were required for the complex computations treatment. 
Each subject utilized the simple reporting form twice and was also 
required to employ the more complex form on two occasions. These 
computational complexity treatments were matched with the rule 
complexity treatments. The sequencing on a group-by-group basis is 
detailed in Figure 2 (p. 33). 
Appendix D presents the Syllabus supplement and the audit 
notification letter. The syllabus supplement was distributed the first 
day of the semester. The procedures to be followed during the semester 
were described in the supplement. The penalty provisions contained 
therein were employed uniformly throughout the semester. The audit 
letters were distributed to the subjects, either in class or by u.s. 
mail, within a week of filing their reporting form. 
Appendix E contains the post-experiment questionnaire and results 
which were administered upon completion of the experiment, at the end 
of the semester. 
APPENDIX A 
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES OVERVIEW 
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STEP-BY-STEP--EXPERIMENT PROCEDURES 
- ~ ~ J : 
__ ':':>...,..., Examination #1 Administered I 
7 to Students 
I Syllabus Explaining Self-grading Process and Penalty structure Distributed 
~~~· = 1 ~ 
Repeat Loop for I I 
Examinations 2, ~ Audits Conducted 
~3, an~d4 _,_ ~:: \k 
I "Normal n Final Examinations 
(30% orrade) 
I. Students Selected for Audit Notified 
Process Data 
(Experimenter Graded all 
Examinations Compared Actual 
Score to Reported score 
- Performed Analysis) 
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EXAMINATION FORMAT 
The examination design was the same throughout the semester. Each 
e~amination consisted of five sections as follows: 
1. 20 Multiple Choice Questions 
2. 10 True/False Questions 
3. 10 Fill-in-the-blank Questions 
4. Journal Entry Problems 









The examinations were designed so that the content tested was equal 
between treatments. However, the actual questions varied between 
treat1oonts to negate student collusion. 
When the students had their examinations returned they also re6eived: 
1. Answer Sheet 
2. Grading Instructions 
3. Reporting Fonns 
The version they received was a function of treatment class. 
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APPENDIX B 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMINATION QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, 
AND INSTRUCTIONS 
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ILLUSTRATIVE FILL-IN-THE-BLANK PROBLEM 
SUBJECl'IVE TRE:A'IMENT 
Exam Question 
1) The is th~ financial 
statement reporting the profit·-
ability of a business entity during 
a specific period of time. 
Answer Sheet 
In this section the correct answer which 
is most commonly utilized is listed 
below. In some instances more than one 
word or phrase have the same meaning. 
If your answer is synonomous with the 
one listed below then it is correct. 
Your answer must have exactly the same 
meaning as the answer given below to be 
considered correct. 
1) Income Statement 
Grading Instructions 
Each correct answer is worth three 
points, Total points earned in this 
section is equal to number of correct 
answers multiplied by 3. Record that 
number on Form One S, Line 3. 
OBJECTIVE TREATI1ENT 
Exam Question 
1) The is the financial 
statement that provides information 
about an entity's resources 'and 
claims against those resources as 
the end of a specific period of 
time. 
Answer Sheet 
In this section it is possible that 
different words or phrases exist which 
carry the same meaning. Accordingly, 
for sonB questions more than one 
answer is listed below. To be correct 
your answer must match up with one of 
the answers provided. The use of 
comnon abbreviations is acceptable. 








Each correct answer is worth three 
points. Enter the total number of 




ILLUS'rRATIVE JOORNAL ENTRY PROBLEM 
SUBJEcriVE TREA'IMENT OBJECriVE TREA'IMENT 
Exam Question The examination questions gives two transactions and require.s 
journal entries be made, 
Answer Sheet Answer Sheet 
For this problem the most common account 
title is utilized for journal entry pur-
poses. In some instances a different or 
modified version of title provided could 
be correct, Your account title will be 
considered correct if it communicates 
the proper meaning, with regard to the 
transaction, within the scope of gener-










Problem 2 - Each line' of each journal 
entry is worth two points~one for 
account title and one for dollar 
amount, If the correct. account and 
amount are selected but· recorded 
improperly (i.e., debited when a 
credit was appropriate; or visa versa) 
then only one point is earned, instead 
of two, If reasonable journal entry 
fonnat is not utilized then no points 
are earned. sum up points earned and 





**Paid-in Capital in 







*capital, capital stock or stock would 
all be considered acceptable substi-
tutes for the account title •common 
stock, • 
**Paid-in capital is an acceptable 
shortened account for the ·answer pro-
vided above 
Note that the use of common abbrevia-
tions (such as A/R for Accounts 
Receivable) is acceptable 
Grading Instructions 
Problem 2 - Each line of each journal 
entry is worth two points--one for 
account title and one for dollar amount. 
If the amount is correct but the ' 
incorrect account title is used, or visa 
versa, then only one point is earned. 
If the correct account and amount are 
selected but recorded improperly (debit 
entry made when credit entry was appro-
priate, or visa versa) then only one 
point is earned, instead of two. No 
points are earned if answers are given 
in such a way that they cannot be iden-
tified as representing journal entries 
(such as listing account names and dollar 
amounts in one column. variationp on 
standard format such as using brackets to 
indicate credit ~aunts will be tolerated. 
Use of common account title abbreviations 
is acceptable. sum up points earned and 
enter on Form 011e S, Line 5, 
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ILLUSTRATIVE ACCOUNTING NUMBER PROBLEM 
SUBJECTIVE TREA'rMENT OBJECTIVE TREATMENT 
Exam Question The examination question provides beginning of the month 
account balances and six events (transactions) which occur 
during the month. The students are required to determine 







D) Accumulated Depreciation 
Answer Sheet 
A) $22,000 C) $20,000 
B) s -o- D) $11,000 
Grading Instructions 
Problem two - Each correct answer is 
worth five points, If an incorrect 
answer is given, partial credit of 
two points may be earned as follows. 
If you failed to consider the impact 
of some, but not all, of the transac-
tions on the account balance, then 
for every transaction for which you 
properly adjusted the account bal-
ance in question one point is earned. 
If the impact of all the transactions 
on an account balance was made in 
arriving at the answer three points 
are earned. Sum up points earned and 










C) $ 3,000 
D) $21,000 
Grading Instructions 
Proble~ one - Each correct answer is 
worth five points. Partial credit for 
incorrect:answers may be earned as 
follows: 
A) Interest Payable - If your incorrect 
answer was the result of failure to 
adjust the account balance for the 
impact of the Jan. 1 trans~ction then 
one point partial credit is earned. 
If your incorrect answer w~s the result 
of a math error made in debermining the 
account balance after the J:an. 1 trans-
action, then three points partial 
credit are earned. 
B) No Partial Credit 
C) Depreciation Expense - If your incor-
rect answer was the result of failure 
to adjust the account balance for the 
Jan. 31 event then one point partial 
credit is earned. 
D) Cash - There are several transactions· 
which effect the cash account. The 
Jan. 1 transaction causes a decrease 
(credit) in cash of $10,500. The Jan. 
16 transaction causes an increase of 
$55,000, the Jan. 22 transaction a 
$4,000 decrease, and the Jan. 26 trans-· 
action a $35 1 500 decrease. For each of 
these handled correctly one point is 
earned. If you handled all transac-
tions correctly but made a math error 
in arriving at the account balance as 
of Jan. 31 then 3 points are earned. 
swn up points earned and enter on Line 7 
of Form one S·. 
APPENDIX C 
EXAMINATION SCORE REPORTING FORMS 
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REPORTING FORM FOR SIMPLE COMPUTATIONAL TREATMENT 
FORM ONE S 
Name Course Section Number -------------------------------- ----------
Address Exam Number ---------------------------- -------
Phone Number Exam Code ------------------------ -------
student ID# ___________ __;Exam Score 
(From Line~8~be~l-o-w) 
Year in School ----------------------
Major ------------------------------
1. Section one, points earned 
2. Section two, };X)ints earned 
3. Section three, points earned 
4. Section four, problem one, points earned 
5. Section Four, problem two, points earned 
6. Section five, problem one, points earned 
7. section five, problem two, points earned 
8. EXAM Score, Add lines 1 through 7 
I have examined this report form ru1d to the best of my knowledge and 
belief the information reported herein is true, correct, and complete. 
I understand that any variance between the exam score reported and an 
audited exam score will result in a loss of exam points, based on the 
penalty structure detailed in the course syllabus. Additionally, if 
there is evidence that the cause of the variance is due to academic 
dishonesty or misconduct, then penalties allowed under university 
guidelines will be invoked. 
(Your Signature) (Date) 
FORM ONE 
REPORTING FORM AND RELATED SCHEDULE 
FOR COMPLEX COMPUTATIONAL TREATMENT 
Name Course Section Number 
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------------------------------- --------
Addres.s Exam Number ----------------------------- -------
Phone Number Exam Code 
----------------------~ -------
Student ID# Exam Score....,..,~--=--
--------------(From Line 12 below) 
Year in School 
~--------------------
Major ____________________________ ___ 
L Perce~t Correct, Multiple Choice Questions 
(attach Schedule MC) % 
2. Multiply the percentage on Line 1 by .375 
and enter here % 
3. Percent Correct, True/False Questions (attach 
Schedule TF) % 
4. Multiply the percentage on Line 3 by .0625 
and enter here % 
5. Percent Correct, Fill-in-the-Blank Questions 
(attach Schedule FB) % 
6. Multiply the percentage on Line 5 by .1875 
and enter here % 
7. Percent Correct, Journal Entries (attach 
Schedule JE) % 
8. Multiply the percentage on Line 7 by .125 
and enter here % 
9. Percent Correct, Problems (attach schedule PB) % 
10. Multiply the percentage on Line 9 by .25 and 
enter here % 
11. Total Percent of Correct Answers (Add Lines 
2, 4, 6, 8, and 10) % 
12. EXAM Score (Multiply Line 11 by 160) 
I have examined this report form and to the best of my knowledge and 
belief the information reported herein is true, correct, and complete. 
I understand that any variance between the exam score reported and an 
audited exam score will result in a loss of exam points, based on the 
penalty structure detailed in the course syllabus. Additionally, if 
there is evidence that the cause of the variance is due to academic 
dishonesty or misconduct, then penalties allowed under university 
guidelines will be invoked. 
(Your Signature) (Date) 
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SCHEDULE MC Multiple Choice Section 
Student Number ____ -:----Name ----------------------------
1. Multiple Choice, number of correct 
answers 
2. Multiply the number on Line 1 by 3 
3. Multiple Choice, number of incorrect 
answers 
4. Subtract Line 3 from Line 2. If 
less than zero, enter zero. 
5. Divide number on Line 4 by 60. write 
the percentage here and on Form One, 
Line 1 
SCHEDULE TF True/False Section 
Name Student Number 
_ __.:___% 
---------------------------- -----------------
1. True/False, Number of correct answers 
2 .. True/False, Number of incorrect answers 
3. Multiply number on Line 2 by .5 
4. Subtrace Line 3 from Line 1. If less 
than zero, enter zero. 
5. Divide number on Line 4 by 10. Write 







1. Fill-in-the-Blank Questions, number of 
correct answers 
2. Multiply number on Line 1 by 3 
3. Divide number on Line 2 by 30. Write 





SCHEDULE JE Journal Entry Section 
Name Student Number 
--~--------------
1. Journal entries, problem one, number of 
points earned 
2. Journal entries, problem two, number of 
pionts earned 
3. Journal entriesr total points earned 
(add lines 1 and 2) 
4. Divide the number on Line 3 by 20. Write 
the percentage here and on Form One, 
Line 7 _ __.;;____% 
SCHEDULE PB Accounting Number Problems Section 
Name Student Number ----------------------------
1. Accounting Problems, problem one, 
number of points earned 
2. Accounting Problems, problem two, 
number of points earned 
3. Accounting Problems, Total Points 
earned, (Add Lines 1 and 2) 
4. Divide the number on Line 3 by 40. 
Write the percentage here and on 




SYLLABUS SUPPLEMENT-PENALTY STRUCTURE 
AND AUDIT NOriFICATION LETTER 
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SYLLABUS SUPPLEMENT - EXAMINATION PROCEDURES 
I 
I 
For purposes of grading the exams in this course, a self-asse$sing 
(self-grading) procedure will be utilized. The following is intended 
to provide a clear description of how this system will function. 
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Exam day will follow typical procedures--exams will be closed-book and 
given during class tiroo. Upon completion of the exam, or at the end of 
class time, whichever comes first, the exam is to be handed in to the 
instructor. 
At the next class meeting, the students will have the exams returned, 
along with answer sheet, grading instructions and reporting forms. The 
student is to complete the reporting forms by utilizing the answer 
sheet and grading instructions. The reporting form will communicate to 
the instructor the points earned on the ex~o. Reporting forms will be 
due at the beginning of the third class period following the exam {1 
week after the exam is returned). The student need turn in only the 
required form(s). '!'he exam~ould be kept by the student as supe9rt 
~tions! Additionally, the student may want to keep a 
copy of reporting forms. 
There are different exam versions and, accordingly, different answer 
sheets, grading instructions, and reporting forms. You must use the 
answer sheets, grading instructions, and reporting forms provided to 
you. Use of materials provided to other students could cause assess-
ment of penalty points for use of improper forms. 
Note that 70% of your grade in this course will be based on the exam 
scores you repqrt. Therefore, it is in your best self-interest to 
follow the instructions to avoid loss of exam points due to penalty 
assessments. 
Enforcement Procedures 
In order to assure compliance with grading instructions, reported exam 
scores will be subject to audit verification with penalties assessed 
for noncompliance. 
Exmns will be selected for audit verification using stratified random 
sampling. If your ex~n is selected for audit, it is essential that you 
are able to produce evidence to support the reported score. According-
ly, you must retain your exam. ' 
Audit Procedures 
Those selected for audit will be informed of such shortly after filing 
the reporting forms. Audit conference time and date will be set. At 
the audit conference the student will be asked to support their ex~n 
score calculations, either in whole or in part. Towards this end it is 
critical that the student keep their exams as it will be the primary 
source of backup for reported score. The auditor will have the report 
forms the student has filed. Additionally, random pages of random 
exams will be xeroxed by the auditor and may be used for audit pur-
poses. If there is a discrepency between the reported score and the 
audited score a penalty will be assessed. 11 
GENERAL PENALTIES I 
Penalty for L~te Fi~ing 
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Students will be assessed a penalty for late filing of an exam score on 
the required forms as follows. If forms are filed after the due date, 
but before the next class meetingv the penalty will be 5% of ~eported 
exam score. For filing one or two class meetings late the penalty will 
be 10% of reported exam score. If filing occurs following the second 
class meeting after the due date, the penalty will be 25% of reported 
score. Additionally, there will be a failure to file penalty--a zero 
on the exam. 
Penalty for Filure to Sign Repqrting Form 
If the exam score reporting form lacks a proper signature, then a 
penalty of 1% of reported score will be assessed. 
Penalty for Use of Improper Fo~ 
If the exam score reporting forn1 is not the same as the form required 
as per the original exam and grading instructions, then a penalty of 
10% of reported score will be assessed. 
Additionally, failure to attach required schedules to exam score 
reporting form will result in assessment of a penalty of 1% of reported . 
exam score, per schedule. 
Math Error Corrections 
If math errors are discovered in the exam score reporting for~, then 
the reported score will be adjusted" This adjustment will be'made 
without an audit conference. Students will be informed of such adjust-
ment. 
Audit Penalty Structure 
1) There will be an automatic "Interest" assessment of 1% of the 
reported exam score if the reported exam score is in excess of the 
audited score. 
2) An additional penalty will be assessed based on the follow. ing 
sliding scale: I 
Excess of Reported Score 
















3) If fraud (cheating) is evident, there will be a fraud penalty 
assessed, rrulging from loss of one letter grade to an F in the 
course. 
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4) No penalties will be assessed if the audited score is greater than 
the reported score. 
5) If the student cannot produce evidence to support reported exam 
score, then, for those section(s) of the exam that are audited, the 
score will be zero and the scope of the audit may be expanded. 
This examination procedure should enhance the learning process. It 
also places a high degree of responsibility on you. Time deadlines 
will be enforced; therefore, if you miss class, you should ma~e other 
arrangements with me to pick up your exam and related materials or to 
turn in report forn~. Finally, I cannot emphasize strongly enough how 
critical it is that you retain your exam copy--without it you will be 





AUDIT NOTIFICATION LETTER 
Doug Laufer 
Acctg. 2103 
An HUsh 005E 
624-7619 
75 
Your Acctg. 2103 exam (exam #3) has been selected for audit 







Audits of exams will be conducted october 9, 10 and 11. It is important 
you contact me to set a s~cific appQintment time. The space below is 
provided to record your appointment. 
APPOINTMENT INFORMATION 
Place: Animal Husbandry Building Date: 
Room No.: OOSE Time: 
For the sections indicated above, the examiner will review your exam 
score reporting form and related information. You will be called upon 
to substantiate the score you have reported. Accordingly, you will 
need to bring the appropriate section(s) of your exam and any other 
relevant material. The audit determination will be on the basis of 
available information only. You will be informed of any proposed exam 
score changes during the audit conference. 
If you have any questions, please contact me at the number shown in the 
heading of this letter (624-7619), of if I cannot be reached at that 
number, call 624-6377 and leave a message. ' 










There is concern and interest about how students feel about the 
experience of using a self-grading system. could you please answer the 
following questions? If you would like to commend on any facet of the 
experience, do so on the class evaluations. Thank you for your 
cooperation. 
Please use the following scale to answer the questions: 
(A) Definitely yes 
(B) Yes 
(C) Not applicable 
(D) No 
(E) Definitely no 
Record your answers on the computer sheet using #2 lead. Do not put 
your name or any information, other than responses to the questions, on 
the sheet. 
1. I enjoyed grading my own exam. 
2. By grading my own exam, I learned more than I would have 0therwise. 
3. Grading my own exam caused me to study less for this course. 
4. I feel the course workload was substantially increased due to self-
grading of the exams. 
5. My effort level in complying with the grading instructions was 
consistent from one exam to the next. 
6. I felt that the grading instructions on son~ exams were more 
difficult to comply with than other exams. 
7. If I was unsure of how to grade a particular question, I gave 
myself the benefit of the doubt. 
8. If the instructor had graded my ex~~ I think I would have received 
the same score. 
9. If the instructor had graded my exam I would have received a lower 
exam score. 
10. If the instructor had graded my exam I would have received a higher 
exam score. 
11. The possibility of an audit caused me to make a stronger effort to 
follow the grading instructions than I would have otherwise. 
12. The possibility of penalties caused me to make a stronger effort to 




At the beginning of the semester I expected to have all of my exams 
audited. I 
I 
14. At the beginning of the semester I expected to have at le~st one of 
my exams audited. 
15. I found complying with the grading instructions created stress for 
me. 
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